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introduction
Ferenc Huoranszki argues for two main claims in the ninth chapter of Freedom 
of the Will: A Conditional Analysis (Huoranszki 2011). First, Huoranszki tries to 
show that libertarian restrictivism is false because self-determination in the lib-
ertarian sense is not necessary for our responsibility, even if motives, reasons or 
psychological characteristics can influence us relatively strongly to choose one 
or the other alternative. second, Huoranszki rejects the so-called manipulation 
argument.1 this is an argument for the conclusion that unless physical indeter-
minism is true, nobody can be morally responsible because our behavior is never 
independent enough of our environment.
therefore, according to Huoranszki, neither libertarian self-determination 
nor physical indeterminism is required for moral responsibility. in my view, 
Huoranszki’s counterarguments do not defeat libertarian restrictivism. How-
ever, they can force philosophers who defend this theory to modify or refine it. 
i analyze Huoranszki’s arguments against libertarian self-determination in the 
first part of my paper. in the second part, i briefly argue for one supervenience 
argument inspired by a similar objection made earlier (bács 2012). According to 
this modified argument, Huoranszki’s theory about abilities and responsibility 
would entail that if physical determinism is true then we are responsible for our 
ordinary actions only because we are able to do miraculous acts as well. if this 
objection is correct, Huoranszki’s compatibilism is unsuccessful.
∗ I would like to thank János Tőzsér, Dávid Such and the reviewer who drew my attention 
to many important details.
1  Huoranszki discusses Pereboom’s (2001: 112-117) version of the argument.
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1. obJections AgAinst tHe tHeory oF selF-ForMAtion  
And A Possible solution
1.1 Restrictivist libertarianism and reason-dependence
before i reconstruct Huoranszki’s argumentation, i summarize briefly why many 
libertarians think that we can only be responsible if it is possible to form our own 
character by choices and actions. robert kane called these self-, character- or 
motive-forming acts (kane 1996). According to restrictivist libertarianism, many 
times agents are not able to choose and do otherwise, since their actual character 
and their motives/reasons determine the way they can choose and act in a par-
ticular situation. nevertheless, they are frequently morally responsible even in 
these cases. this is so if their character and their motives/reasons are the conse-
quences of former choices and intentional actions. if an agent has an irresistibly 
strong motive, and if the strength of one’s motive is impossible to derive from 
former choices, the agent is not morally responsible.
the main idea behind this theory of responsibility is that the impossibility of 
acting otherwise, at least in many cases, has different source than the physical 
infeasibility of the alternative action. rather, the alternative action is impos-
sible because there are not psychologically sufficient grounds to act otherwise. 
it is plausible that a sadistic serial killer might be unable to show mercy for her 
next victim because she lacks emphatic motivation. even if she can perceive 
moral reasons, their motivational power is too low compared to her selfish sa-
distic desires. Why would she act suddenly in a more humanistic way if nothing 
inclines her to do so? still, she is responsible, because her former choices made 
her conscience too weak. According to this kind of libertarianism, the agent is 
ultimately responsible2 despite the fact that she cannot choose otherwise just be-
fore the murder, if there was, somewhere in the past, at least one key situation 
(i) where sadistic motivations have significant motivational rivals and (ii) the 
decision made in that situation is the very origin of the weakness of humanistic 
motivations. one can be free in a direct way only if one has at least two signifi-
cant motivational tendencies.
since robert kane has elaborated the theory of self-forming acts in most de-
tailed fashion, my suggestions about moral development will mostly be based 
on kane’s theory. Huoranszki has a special objection to kane’s restrictivism. He 
claims that kane’s theory presupposes the reason-dependence of free choices.
2  According to kane, an agent is ultimately responsible for an act if their act’s ultimate 
source is the agent herself, and not the environment, the past, education and so on. (kane 
1996: 33-35.)
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in kane’s view, we can use our free will directly if the agent perceives at least 
two sets of reasons suggesting different choices about the particular situation 
(kane 1996: 114). kane holds that character-forming acts are based on rational 
choices, because this kind of choice can ensure that the agent is in control.3 
desires and other possible irrational motives only increase the probability of 
alternatives. this is because they force the will to make a greater effort in so far 
as the agent tries to choose the other reason, which has less motivational support 
(kane 2007: 36).
Huoranszki’s problem with this understanding of reason-dependence is the 
following. We frequently have responsibility for acts which are not based on 
reasons. For instance, weak-willed or negligent actions, actes gratuits,4 and so 
on. it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze this claim. However, i should 
mention that restrictivist libertarians have an answer to this problem of self-for-
mation even if they would not reject Huoranszki’s claims about irrational acts. 
A restrictivist libertarian can claim agents are responsible for acts not based upon 
reasons as long as the strong irrational compulsions are consequences of a clearly 
reason-dependent self-forming choice. this answer is not doomed to failure if 
self-forming actions can be the ground of moral responsibility.
beyond this issue, Huoranszki has other counterarguments against libertarian 
self-determination. 
A) the consequence of libertarian self-determination theory is either that the 
agents have a point in their life after which they just act quasi-mechanically or 
there is a stage in the agent’s life when she does not have the relevant trait and 
hence cannot adequately perceive (moral) reasons. these consequences are very 
implausible (Huoranszki 2011: 170). Moreover, it is not clear how someone who 
cannot perceive reasons in relevant situations can be responsible.
b) libertarian self-determination is not the grounds of moral responsibility since 
agents are not able to control how their acts form their characters and motives. this 
is because agents cannot acquire the desired moral motives and character traits 
by conscious habituation (or at least this cannot be typical). Why? (b1) conscious 
habituation often has undesired moral effects. (b2) conscious habituation is not 
effective enough. (b3) effects of regular actions on character traits cannot be fore-
seen and controlled by the agent. (Huoranszki 2011: 170-175.)
3  since, according to kane, the responsible self’s will is fundamentally rational. (kane 
1996: 21-28.) 
4  these are acts agents perform intentionally but for no particular reason.
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c) the relative strength of some motives, reasons and character traits cannot de-
prive the ability to choose and to do otherwise in non-pathological cases (Huoran-
szki 2011: 174-175). this is because the ability to choose otherwise requires first 
and foremost that the agent can represent herself as somebody who can do more 
than one thing in a particular situation.5 
i answer objection A) in section 1.2, (b1) in 1.3, (b2) and (b3) in 1.4, and c) in 1.5.
1.2 Character-forming acts and automatism
According to Huoranszki, the problem described in A) is the least worrying one. 
However, he thinks that it does pose a challenge for libertarian self-determi-
nation. the source of this problem is that restrictivist libertarians say there are 
strong opposing reasons/motivations only in the case of self-determining acts. 
it would imply that agents who have carried out self-forming acts in one way or 
another and acquired a new character trait behave quasi-mechanistically accord-
ing to these characteristics.
Huoranszki suggests that the only alternative to avoid this consequence is 
a dead end. if libertarians claim that positive character traits enable agents to 
perceive moral reasons, this then would explain why she always acts rightly. 
but this solution does not help. if the agent cannot perceive moral reasons ad-
equately before acquiring the proper character traits, how could the self-forming 
actions when the agent is not able to perceive these reasons be the grounds for 
her moral responsibility?
in my view, the first option of quasi-mechanistic acting is actually not that 
problematic or implausible provided we respect the complexity of the human 
motivational system. i think the human motivational system requires psycho-
logical and natural scientific investigation. in other words, philosophers can only 
make sketchy remarks about it. nevertheless, it seems that agents have many 
different dispositions which can ground opposite motivations and reasons in par-
ticular situations.
let us suppose that somebody has three relatively strong motivational dis-
positions: irascibility, respect for authority, and altruism. Furthermore, imagine 
that she resists her irascibility when she speaks with her boss, as she would like 
to respect her. this might strengthen her self-control so that she will always 
resist her irascibility when it clashes with respect for authority. However, this 
does not mean that she can resist her bad temper in every case. For example, 
5  this last claim is made before chapter nine (Huoranszki 2011: 41). nonetheless, it is 
important because it is meant to explain why character traits and ordinary psychological states 
cannot, according to Huoranszki, deprive us of our ability to do otherwise.
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in a situation where her irascibility clashes with her altruism, it is questionable 
which disposition will win. or if her other dispositions militate against her re-
spectfulness, she may not obey her superior. However, i believe it is probable 
that her former choices for respectful acts raise the probability of obeying.
the point is that, even if somebody acquires a new character trait, she may 
not act accordingly in a different type of situation where this trait has a different 
motivational “rival”. Moreover, it is also possible that she loses her character 
trait. if the employee acts irascibly in other situations where the temptation has 
different motivational rivals, her irascibility may become stronger. As a result, 
she may later not be able to show respect toward her superior. in my opinion, all 
this is not incompatible with kane’s or Aristotle’s conception of self-formation.
there is another reason why the charge of quasi-automatism is not an es-
sential problem for restrictivist libertarianism. granted, actions determined by 
strong character traits are automatic in the sense that the agent always acts in the 
same way in similar situations. in addition, in these cases the agent’s habituation 
is so strong that it is possible to predict how she is going to act. but this need not 
prevent her from perceiving opposing reasons.
kane distinguishes between the notion of external and internal reason (kane 
1996: 29-30). usually, philosophers talk about internal reasons in the free will 
debate because only internal reasons have significant motivational power in the 
agent’s deliberation process, while external reasons are not supposed to have 
such influence. they are mere facts, which theoretically could have been a rea-
son for someone, but actually they do not motivate the agent. in kane’s exam-
ple, someone who does not know that her friend will go to some party will not 
be motivated by this fact. nevertheless, this fact is a reason for her to go to the 
party in the externalist sense.
in my opinion, the case of a perfectly virtuous agent would be similar to this 
in some respects. granted, she could perceive that the morally wrong options 
have some benefits. so this example does differ in one way. still, this knowledge 
did not really pose a danger that she would choose the morally right alternative 
every time. in short, she perceives morally wrong reasons, but these would be 
reason for her only in the externalist sense. therefore, acquiring new character 
traits changes not the cognitive capacity and reason-perceiving ability (i do not 
exclude that this can sometimes happen during character-formation), but the 
motivational background, the motivational power of reasons, desires, and so on.
it is important to note that if we accept this view of self-formation suggested 
by kane, ordinary habituation and self-formation will be similar in some respects. 
nevertheless, there remain important differences. it may well be that the Aris-
totelian theory of self-formation criticized by Huoranszki does indeed put too 
much stress on the similarity. so i agree with Huoranszki that (b1) agents cannot 
acquire moral motives and character traits by conscious habituation (or at least 
this is not a paradigmatic case). Furthermore, i do not deny that (b2) the way 
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regular actions impact on character traits cannot constitute control in the ordi-
nary sense of ‘control’. still, i claim that agents are responsible for the morally 
relevant consequences of character-forming acts.
1.3 The invisible hand of character-formation
Why is Huoranszki so skeptical regarding agents’ ability to acquire motives and 
character traits by conscious habituation? Huoranszki does not deny that some-
times it is possible to gain these character traits in this way. nonetheless, he 
has the problem that conscious habituation is not reliable, because trying con-
sciously to develop a character trait can produce the opposite result (b1). His 
example is the following:
let us suppose that someone does not have the disposition to behave kindly or 
respectfully with others. but she does judge in many situations that the best thing 
for her to do would be to behave kindly and respectfully. thus, she makes an ef-
fort and, if she is continent enough, then she can regularly behave as if she was 
naturally kind and respectful. 
the result of such kind of behavior may be disastrous. it is all too easy to im-
agine that instead of acquiring kindness and respectfulness, the person becomes 
a hypocrite. … there is no guarantee that the recognition of what behavioral pat-
terns would manifest such traits and the attempt to conform one’s behavior to such 
recognition will necessarily improve her ‘moral self’. (Huoranszki 2011: 171.)
there is something odd about this example though. A hypocrite who shows re-
spectful behavior to somebody else does not really think that this other person 
has earned her respect. she behaves this way only because she believes that this 
hypocritical behavior will somehow pay off. consequently, a hypocrite does not 
really want to be respectful with other people if she really is a hypocrite. so if 
the agent would like to be a kind and respectful person because she thought that 
this is morally good and other people deserve this kind of treatment, she was 
obviously not a hypocrite to begin with.
i cannot imagine a scenario in which somebody, who has such good inten-
tions, loses her respect towards somebody else because she tries to behave re-
spectfully. Maybe Huoranszki is thinking here of someone who is misanthropic 
but does not like herself just because of her misanthropy. but again, if some-
body hates her own misanthropy because she believes that people deserve bet-
ter, she will not be a hypocrite if she behaves not as her inclinations dictate but 
as her rational considerations do. this remains true even if her misanthropic 
feelings will never change. suppose the misanthrope learns how to behave dif-
ferently from what her irrational dispositions dictate. suppose, moreover, that 
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she behaves kindly, even in cases in which she rationally thinks that it would 
be good if she had not behaved so nicely. the problem is not that she learned 
to be kind to people who deserve it. the real problem is that she does not have 
sufficient self-control to use her skills rightly. but this is a different problem. 
the source of disagreement with Huoranszki here is that i attribute great 
importance to motivations to behave morally rightly. if somebody acts appro-
priately because she attempts to gain values which are distant from the terri-
tory of the morally right, the behavior and the choice which is behind the act 
might not have had a positive character-forming effect. Moreover, in my view, 
the character-forming choices which have a morally good effect have a different 
motivational center than the desire forming the agent’s character.
this is the point where the Aristotelian model needs to be refined. Aristotle 
does not pay enough attention to the fact that motivations are indifferent in the 
case of ordinary skills but very important if we try to develop our moral virtues. 
if somebody paints frequently because she would like to learn painting, it is not 
relevant why she wants to be a good painter. but this is an important aspect if 
we investigate the problem of moral development.
it is at the very least suspicious if somebody acts morally rightly just for the 
reason that she would like to acquire a better character trait. but it is an entirely 
different case if the agent desires better character traits because, for example, 
she would like to help other people. Also, more commonly, in the case of posi-
tive character-forming actions the agent does not think about the action’s char-
acter-forming power at all. the agent concentrates only on the action’s potential 
good effects on other people and on its moral rightness. by contrast, if somebody 
wants to act morally rightly because she desires to gain new character traits, she 
uses people as a means. it may well be that the main motivation is only vanity 
or ambition.6
there is no reason to suppose that suitably motivated unselfish choices could 
have any morally problematic side-effects on one’s personality. A long series 
of morally impeccable choices ensures the development of moral character un-
intentionally and invisibly, just as selfish choices ensure economic growth in 
Adam smith’s theory.
1.4 Pre-established harmony
Huoranszki criticized Aristotelian self-formation theory for claiming that the 
main source of moral responsibility is the conscious and direct practice of virtue. 
i granted that conscious and direct practice is not the paradigmatic form of gain-
6  robert kane (1996: 126–127) thinks also that the typical examples of self-forming choices 
are not outrightly directed at self-formation.
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ing new morally important character traits. so i also rejected the Aristotelian 
picture, at least in part.
but my solution made it less clear how agents can control their character de-
velopment. one problem is this. if character-forming choices have limited con-
sequences, they cannot totally guarantee our virtuous acting in situations which 
are different from the original character-forming situation (b2). their effects 
are too partial. this is Huoranszki’s second problem about self-forming actions. 
His third objection is the following. if conscious practice is not the best way 
to gain character traits, how we can ensure that we will be morally good people? 
if we cannot foresee what the consequences of our acts will be, why would we 
be responsible for our morally wrong acts (b3)? After all, their origin was a seem-
ingly harmless choice, the effects of which were not predictable. First, i attempt 
to answer to (b3) objection. subsequently, i will try to answer and offer a pos-
sible solution to problem of the limited efficacy of self-forming acts.
i claimed previously that actions and choices based on morally perfect mo-
tivations had no harmful influence on character development. in addition, it 
seems that these choices have frequently good effects. by the same token, self-
forming choices based on inappropriate motivations almost always have a nega-
tive impact. i also suppose that morally neutral choices, based on neither posi-
tive nor negative motivations, have no morally relevant outcomes. My point is 
that if such ‘pre-established harmony’ actually exists between choices/acts and 
character-forming results, there is no need to foresee or control the character-
forming effects of choices to be responsible for them. it is enough if the agent 
knows which acts and choices are morally good and morally bad. or, at least, we 
can say that the agent should have known this. 
For instance, if somebody knew from a reliable person that it would be morally 
wrong to pour water on a box with a bright red ‘dangerous’ label on it, she is mor-
ally responsible for the explosion if she does so. this will be so even if she did 
not know that it was a necessary consequence of the fact that this box contained 
sodium explosive. Another example is the following. suppose that somebody 
knows that using strong drugs for hedonistic aims is morally bad. However, she 
has not heard that strong drugs turn people into addicts. if she does not care 
about her moral knowledge, she is not only morally responsible for using drugs. 
she is also responsible for becoming an addict.7 similarly, if a person knew that 
it would be blameworthy if she acted in a particular way, and she chose this pos-
sibility anyway, she is responsible both for the choice and its bad influence on 
her character, even if she could not have known anything about the character-
forming effect of her choice. on the one hand, if we had a strong notion of con-
trol, agents did not control the results—neither the destructive explosion nor 
7  nevertheless, this kind of ignorance about the character-forming effects can slightly 
moderate the agent’s blameworthiness.
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the changing of moral character. on the other hand, if we use a weaker notion of 
control, we can say that she had control over what will happen in the future. in 
my opinion, this latter degree of control is enough to be morally responsible for 
a character-forming effect, if the agent knew or should have known the moral 
value8 of the possible choices, since there is harmony between character-forming choices 
and their results.
but how is such harmony possible? i cannot present a full theory of character-
formation here. My purpose is only to prove that Huoranszki’s arguments are 
not conclusive against restrictivist libertarianism. but to make this defense more 
plausible, i briefly have to say something about the general issue as well.
so, first, i think that the presupposition of “harmony” fits best with an “in-
tentionalist morality” in which wrong acts are based directly or indirectly on 
morally problematic intentions. An intention of a morally responsible agent is 
morally problematic if it is directed at some option of inferior value compared to 
other alternatives also accessible in the particular situation (provided the agent 
knew or should have known that this option is less valuable). if an intention is 
based on such inferior reasons, it will be less and less probable that the agent 
will form intentions based on morally superior values later. this is because she 
becomes accustomed to choosing in this way. Moreover, she is likely to identify 
increasingly with the value set compatible with her former choices.
consequently, people who are motivated by selfishness where other people’s 
interests would demand that they tell the truth will be more likely to lie in 
similar future situations. the probability of immoral action by such agents is 
increased in different situations as well. For instance, in a situation where the 
question for the agent is whether to embezzle some money or not.
if altruist intentions are indeed so central to morality and moral development, 
we can answer Huoranszki’s second objection about self-forming action’s partial 
effects. Altruism has many different manifestations in different virtues. none-
theless, these moral virtues are not totally independent from each other. each 
one is linked in one way or another to the willingness to undertake selfless ac-
tions. if this is true, every altruist choice can be considered a “preparation” for 
other moral challenges. so i claim that if one does everything to be an altruist 
person, that is, if it is a real possibility that one unselfishly chooses the morally 
good option, then one can form their character effectively. therefore, one can 
be morally responsible for a morally wrong action even if one is not able to do 
otherwise, provided this inability is a consequence of a selfish and morally prob-
lematic choice in the first place.
8  if she knows about the moral value of an act, it does not mean that she knows about the 
self-forming effects of the action.
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1.5 Representations without motivations—calculable failure
Huoranszki could complain that such a theory of character formation is not re-
quired. According to Huoranszki, character traits and the motivational back-
ground cannot undermine the agent’s ability to do otherwise. Furthermore, the 
ability to do and choose otherwise presupposes only that the agent is able to 
recognize moral reasons and represent herself as somebody who can act in more 
than one way (Huoranszki 2011: 41). And it is beyond dispute that a brave man 
can represent himself as somebody who runs away from battle. Also, a coward is 
able to see himself as somebody who dies for his country.
i do not agree with Huoranszki on this point either. sometimes ordinary peo-
ple who have no pathological psychological problems can misrepresent their 
abilities in such a way that they have a false belief about what they are able to 
do psychologically. let us suppose a football player in his thirties thinks about 
whether to retire. He is not particularly self-aware and does not know that he is 
a very ambitious person. but his mother is wiser, and knows that her son would 
be unable to keep his promise to spend more time with his family after his re-
tirement, even if he did perceive that it would be the morally right choice. the 
reason for this is that the football player has no real desire to act in the morally 
right way. nor would he really like to spend much more time with his family. 
He made his promise just because he wanted to put an end to a quarrel with his 
wife. in fact, he deceived himself about his real motivations.
i think that such self-deception is not pathological. the football player is 
responsible if he breaks his promise to his family. this is because the lack of 
appropriate motivation is explained by his former selfish choices.
Huoranszki would disagree. He would say that this football player could have 
chosen otherwise in this particular situation even if he had a selfish character.9 
He perceives the right course of action and he thinks that he is able to choose 
it. He just does not choose this alternative, as it turns out. but why does he not 
choose this alternative? Huoranszki suggests that there is no full explanation. 
nor is such an explanation possible in principle (Huoranszki 2011: 162). con-
trary to restrictivist libertarianism, Huoranszki (2011: 118) denies that psycho-
logical states of non-pathological agents can determine how they choose and act. 
Firstly, i believe that this is empirically improbable, because not only psy-
chological experts but also ordinary people who are good judges of character can 
predict decisions. take the football player’s mother in the previous example. 
secondly, sometimes we feel that we can give a perfectly exhaustive answer to the 
9  Moreover, Huoranszki (2011: 175) claims that the only actions that reveal our character are 
ones we could have avoided. i beg to differ. i agree that actions that are physically impossible 
to avoid cannot reveal our character. However, i would argue that actions unavoidable due to 
psychological states are the most revealing as to our character traits. 
114 Are We Free AFter All? reAding HuorAnszki
question of why the agent decides in one way and not another, by referring to 
the agent’s reasons, desires and other psychological states. 
to summarize, in the first part of my paper i provided a possible defense 
of restrictivist libertarianism against Huoranszki’s arguments. Moreover, i have 
argued that the hypothesis of self-formation is not all that implausible. Although 
the right theory of self-formation has to diverge to some extent from Aristotle’s 
approach, restrictivist libertarianism is a better theoretical option to save moral 
responsibility.
2.0 Are we responsible for not doing miracles?
in the second part of chapter nine, Huoranszki returns to the question whether 
free will and moral responsibility are compatible with physical determinism 
(Huoranszki 2011: 175-182). Many libertarians claim that even if self-formation 
is not necessary for exercising free will, physical indeterminism is an indispen-
sible condition so that agents can be independent enough of their social and 
physical environment.
contrary to some compatibilists, Huoranszki accepts that some degree of in-
dependence is needed for moral responsibility. but he claims that social and 
physical laws do not endanger our independence.
First of all, he denies the possibility of strong social determinism. there is no 
social training which could deprive us of our ability to do otherwise. social train-
ing mainly determines our character and motives. but, according to Huoranszki, 
our character and motives cannot determine how we choose or act. therefore, 
social training cannot determine how we act in a particular situation. As already 
noted, i do not agree with this because i think motives and character can deter-
mine our action in some cases. 
Huoranszki thinks the only possible way that social determinism can be a 
problem for a compatibilist is if libertarians can prove that social determinism 
necessarily follows from physical determinism. i agree with Huoranszki that this 
is a difficult, perhaps impossible, task. However, the libertarian does not have to 
show this in order to refute Huoranszki. 
i believe Huoranszki accepts all of the following claims. First, that free ac-
tions need more independence than physical particles with regard to physical 
laws and past events. it is important for Huoranszki that social and psychological 
phenomena cannot reduce to physical ones. second, that our actions are physical 
events (at least partly). third, that there are free actions. but given these claims 
it is hard to see how they can simultaneously be true. the argument to show this 
runs as follows:
lászló bernátH: selF-ForMing Acts And otHer MirAcles 115
(1)  two alternative actions related to the same agent and the same situation are 
connected to different movements of particles constituting the body. so the 
agent could have acted otherwise in every case only if her body’s particles could 
have moved otherwise. 
(2)  if the movement of a set of particles depends on something to some degree, 
the action connected to this movement depends on the same thing to the same 
degree as the movement of the set of particles itself.
(3)  every movement of a set of particles is dependent on physical laws and past 
physical events to such a high degree that, according to physical laws, if deter-
minism is true, any moving sets of particles could have moved otherwise only 
by some miracle (i.e. due to an event violating physical laws).
[2+3] (4) every action is dependent on physical laws and past physical events to 
such a high degree that, if determinism is true, any action carried out according 
to physical laws could have been done otherwise only at the cost of a miracle.
(5)  (At least) most actions are carried out according to physical laws and past physi-
cal events in the actual world.
(6)  nobody can be responsible for an action which could only have been done 
otherwise at the cost of a miracle.
(c) no agent can be responsible for (at least) most of her actions in the actual world.
this argument modifies bács’s (2012) supervenience argument,10 and the in-
dependence argument of incompatibilists such as Pereboom.11 i attempted to 
preserve the main intuitions underlying these arguments while directing them 
specifically against Huoranszki’s compatibilism.
the first two premises establish the consequences of the fact that the execu-
tion of every action supervenes on movements of our particles. We cannot act 
differently from action ‘x’ if our body’s particles do not move differently from 
how they would move if we carried out action ‘x’. thus if the conjunction of 
physical laws and the remote past determines which movement of the particles 
would be a miracle at a particular time t, this also determines which act would 
be found in this “miraculous” category. Furthermore, if physical determinism is 
true, only one kind of movement for every set of particles is not a special move-
ment at any particular time. but since every different action implies different 
10  bács’s argument relies on the supposition that mental states supervene on brain 
processes. i utilize only the supervenience-relation between the movement of action and 
particles. i do so because the former relation is unclear. Huoranszki (2013) takes advantage of 
this in his answer to bács.
11  Pereboom (2001) argues that if determinism is true, we are not responsible because 
the environment determines how we choose and act. this is because there is no important 
difference between manipulation and ordinary causal chains. by contrast, my point here is 
that the world determines only whether an action would be a miracle or not. i think this is 
sufficient to reject Huoranszki’s special version of compatibilism.
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movements by the particles, at any time t an agent can execute only one action 
that is not a miracle. 
Huoranszki holds that if we are morally responsible, we are able to act in more 
than one way. He also claims that an agent morally responsible because she is 
able to act in more than one way. together with the claims above it would follow 
that if determinism is true, we are able to perform at least one miraculous action 
in every situation when we are morally responsible. Moreover, it would follow 
that we are morally responsible just because we could have performed a miracle 
(viz. other than how the laws of physics dictate it).
this would be an absurd conclusion. even if agents were able to perform 
miracles in some sense of the word, this ability could not be grounds for moral 
responsibility. For instance, this would have the unacceptable consequence that 
if the agent failed to meet her obligation, fulfilling her obligation would have 
been a miracle.
suMMAry
i have tried to show that restrictivist libertarianism is a defensible theory. i also 
pointed out that Huoranszki gives us too much freedom when he argues that an 
agent’s character and her psychological background can never determine choic-
es and actions of psychologically healthy persons. Furthermore, his compatibi-
lism cannot handle the apparent implication of physical determinism that only 
one possible action of the agent is not a miracle at any given time t.
Huoranszki’s objections against the theory of self-forming actions can force 
libertarians to develop a self-formation theory less directly based on the Aristo-
telian analogy between character-development and the acquisition of practical 
skills. i have sketched such a theory here, but of course there remain many open 
questions about character development.
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